Can Frequentist Inference Be Very Wrong? A Conditional 'Yes' by Hinkley, David
; 
Can Frequentist Inferences Be Very Wrong? 
A Conditional 'Yes'.* 
by 
David V. Hinkley 
University of Minnesota 
Technical Report No. 397 
January 1982 
This research supported in part by NSF Grant MCS-79-04558. 
*This is an expanded version of a lecture given at the 
Conference on Scientific Inference, Data Analysis, and 
Robustness at Madison, Wisconsin in November 1981. 
~ 
·'.····-
-. -,;;:. .. -; 
·~:.~ ;: ... ~~-
... .-.. 
,-:,·.·i·,n:-:r\_1k::::= :or y~·:iqr~··•\T\· ,\'.\~-~t",f"'P!:!fP pt 11,~:.\r?l!!l'(:1: r:·H~T" 
c<~:l: T-. r. !:.r::i '<':~· . nti :_:_.: c· Tr-'"'r· r r r·~; p 'l; r.:r_ ~pq(?,.~ l:?f 1:, yt1•:JJ :\ ::~p-~ -~ r.: Hll 
l,-.X,rT;::! r:·~ ,-:·~! (~;~d~·'JPOC~ll ,\t~~l-_;q·(':'tl. ('[ ·'-:1 r,::cr.r,}:'.{-:: 1l fi\C-tt ~}':' .. q._t<:= 
1- :• '='' ·~" . 
- .......... ' 
:'"· .. ; -.- '. - -- . -: -.- - ·. 
;; 
·:· -- - ,-·.- .- -· 
.. .#' 
Can Frequentist Inferences Be Very. Wrong? 
A Conditional 'Yes'. 
by 
David v. Hinkley 
"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data" 
Sherlock Holmes, in Scandal in Bohemia 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The major operational difference between Bayesian and 
i 
frequentist i~ferences is that in the latter one must choose 
a reference set for the sample, in order to obtain inferen-
tial probabilities. It is our thesis that in the matter of 
choosing a reference set, Sherlock Holmes was right, and 
that many frequentist inferences are inadequate because of 
erroneous choices made prior to the experiment. 
It could not be argued with any conviction that the 
mathematization of statistics was other th~n very beneficial. 
The introduction of mathematics permitted logical develop-
ment of the ideas of sufficiency, efficiency, hypothesis 
testing, design of experiments, quality control, multivariate 
data reduction and robustness, among others. Many of the 
current major advances in statistics rely heavily on sophis-
ticated mathematics. 
And ye~ the formal structures of mathematical statistics 
seem to have a blind spot. Most of the mathematical devel-
opment has to do with pre-data analysis: Is such-and-such 
likely to be a good procedure? How should we plan to do 
so-and-so? To answer such questions requites one to embed 
one's particular statistical problem a priori in a sample 
space with superimposed probability distri~ution over 
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potential realizations. The blind spot is the implicit 
assumption that pre-data probability calculations are rele-
vant to post-data inferences. ·This blind spot is covered by 
Bayes's Theorem, which explicitly recognises the difference 
between pre-data and post-data contexts. Must the blind-
spot remain in frequentist statistics? First we must recog-
nize that it exists, and that is one purpo~e of the present 
paper: to show by example how haive frequentist answers can 
be misleading. 
Some of our difficulties can be traced to the way in 
which we learn and teach probability and statistics. Whil~ 
we place great emphasis on the calculus of probability, we 
say little about the practical use of probability-other 
than to endorse the simple relative frequency interpretation. 
The following three probability statements suggest a variety 
of application that we would do well to understand and teach 
P(coin will land head-up on a single flip)=½ 
P{rain tomorrow in Madison)=½ 
P{nuclear war in Europe before 1990) = ½. 
It is evident that relative frequency in a real sequence of 
repeated experiments is simply not a rich enough interpre-
tation of probability. 
When we move from probability to tneoretical statistics, 
we start by introducing such problems as "Let x1 , .•• , Xn 
be i.i.d. with p.d.f. f 8 (x) .•• " and "Let Yi= a0 + SlXi + Ei' 
where £ 1 , ••• , En are i.i.d. N(0, a
2)." What meanings might 
these statements have? How do we determine that such state-
ments are reasonable, even as approximations? I believe 
that there is far too little integration of inference with 
modelling and model diagnosis. For example, where do we read 
about inference subject to adequacy of model fit as judged by 
a goodness-of-fit test? 
Once exact models are estabiished, theoretical discussion 
focusses on exactness: unbiasedness, sufficiency, locally 
most powerful, inadmissibility, ancillarity, and so on. Of 
course these exact concepts are useful, in part because they 
prevent loose thought and ad hocery-but the concepts and 
exact properties should be used only as guides for careful 
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approximate analysis. Pedantic obsession with exactness can 
lead to absurditr, as a simple example will illustrate. 
Example 1. Suppose that a population of N elements, with 
associated measurements (x1 , y1 ), ••• , (xN, yN), is sampled 
randomly n times with replacement. Let the generic sampled 
values be denoted by x. = x1 . and Y. = y1 , i = 1, ••• , n; 1 -1 1 1 i 
of course Pr(Ii = k) = N • A graph of tne data strongly 
suggests that y ~ ax, and deviations from this approximate 
relationship seem reasonably random except for absolute 
magnitude. One might then propose the working model 
Y. =ax.+€. 
1 1 1 
, 
with€~ independent such that E(E,IX. = x) = 0 and 
1 2 1 1 2 
Var(E.IX. =X) = a (~), where the form of a(•) is suggested 
1 1 
by the sample. But now suppose that x1 , ••• , xN are known 
and that they are distinct (not an unusual occurence). Then 
it cannot be true that E(E.IX. = x) = O, since E(E.IX. = x.) 
1 l 1 1 J 
= Y· - ax., and further var(€.1x. = x.) = o. This truth is J J 1 l J 
useless to practical analysis of the data. One reasonable 
mathematical way to proceed is by acknowledging that 
"E(E. IX. = x) = O" stands for "lave(y. - ax.Ix - 6 < x. < 
l l 1 1 - 1 -
x +.6) I < E" for suitably small 6 and E-if a full-blown 
mathematical description is needed, which is doubtful. 
This bri~f general discussion has raised questions 
about the difference between pre- and post-data probability 
calculations, the legitimacy of exact theory when integrated 
·with practical application, and careful specification and 
understanding of what a statistical model means in practical 
terms. The purpose of the more detailed discussion which 
follows is to consider four topics where naive application 
of frequentist statistical theory_ can lead to incorrect or 
unhelpful inferences, whereas careful attention to the above 
questions can lead to sensible frquentist inferences. 
The four topics to be discussed are: likelihood 
inference, inference from transformed data, randomization in 
design of experiments and surveys, and robust estimation. 
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One main thrust of the paper is that the general con-
cept of ancillarity is an integral part of statistics. 
Beyond that, on~ might conclude that Bayesian inference pro-
vides a simple, direct way of obtaining sensible answers. 
This does not conflict with the view that frequency provides 
operational substance to many inferences. It is my curious 
belief that careful frequentist and careful Bayesian ap-
proaches can complement one another. 
2. Likelihood Inference 
The most clearly developed framework for inference 
principles and methods is that of stochastic models with a 
single unknown parameter. A conventional problem would 
treat observations (x1 , ••• ,xn) =~as a realization of random 
variables (X1 , ••• ,x) = X whose joint distribution has den-n -
sity f(~le). Our discussion begins by reviewing what is 
known for the case of independent Xi, explained for simpli-
city under the assumption of homogeneity--that is, f(~fe) = 
rr g(xjje). Part of our purpose is to expose an alternative 
large-sample approximate theory for likelihood inference, 
and to suggest by example how widely applicable that approxi-
mate theory may be. 
There is agreement that for inference under a given 
model assumption,~ should first be reduced to the minimal 
sufficient statistic. In general this does not simplify 
matters much, so we must deal with approximate sufficiency. 
One program is to reduce 
" where 8 is the MLE, and A contains transformed character~ 
-istics of the likelihood sh~pe. The larger is p, the less 
information is lost in the reduction in general. In partic-
ular, if p = 1 and if A1 is the studentized form of the ob-
served information ·1 = -{d2 logf(~l8)/d8 2}8=e' then the r-. ,.. 
information lost in reducing ~ -+ (8, I) = (8 ,A1 ) is o (1) as 
" n-+ ~. (Reduction~-+ 8 does not have this property.) It 
is fairly clear that the rest of the likelihood shape, for-
malized in (A2 , ••• ), can be ignored if the likelihood is 
very nearly normal in·shape,· which is often the case for 
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quite moderate sample size. It is also very clear from ex-
amples that the variation in spread of normal-shaped likeli-
,... 
hoods can be appreciable, which is why reduction~+ e is 
often inadequate--as ca,.l.culation of s.e. (I) would indicate. 
Given appropriate (non-unique) definitions of A1 , ... Ap, 
one can show that 
(i) I%(8_:e) - N ( 0, 1) given A=a -- (2.1) 
-
, 
( ii) I/E(I) -1 2 Ce = 0 (1) - N(l,n ce> 
-
, 
( iii) A ::: Np ( 0,1). 
-
(For simplicity I write E(I) in place of E{-d2 logf(~je)/ 
d8 2}8=8 , which it approximately equals.) These distribu-
tional approximations form the basis for an approximate an-
" alysis based on the approximate sufficient statistic (8,~), 
and of course more refined approximations may sometimes be 
,... 
needed. If we were to reduce~+ e, (i)-(iii) would not be 
directly relevant, but (i) and (ii) do imply 
( i' ) . {E (I) } \ ( 8-8) ::: N ( 0, 1) ( 2. 2) 
unconditionally, which is the classical first approximation 
,... 
result for the large-sample distribution of e. The unusual 
derivation of (i') from (i) and (ii) will be important below. 
The expressions (i) and (iii) give the (approximate) 
sufficient pivotal inference 11 1 15 ce-e) is a standard normal 
random variable"--statement of the value a of A is uninforma-
- -
tive. Why use the conditional statement (t) rather than (ii? 
To answer this in detail would be to repeat well-worn argu-
ments for the conditionality principle, which we need not do; 
see Efron & Hinkley (1978). One brief answer will be given: 
if inference is contingent on adequacy of model fit, then the 
same (conditional) pivotal inference statement is valid, be-
cause the fit of the model is tested using A (for example, 
2 -the chi-squared statistic tAj)--therefore the model adequacy 
restriction is covered by the conditioning on~=~· By con-
trast, the distributional approximation (i') may be recog-
nizably invalid for subsets of the a priori sample space which 
are determined by restrictions on~-
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It should be clear that (2.1) (i) may not be sufficient-
ly accurate. Both Cox (1980) and Hinkley (1980) show that 
the likelihood i~self can be integrated to give a more accur-
ate approximation for the conditional distribution of 
I\(8-8). This brings us tantalizingly close to the formal 
Bayesian posterior distribution. Notice that the Bayesian 
analysis requires no choice of pivot, which might prompt a 
frequentist to investigate the whole class of approximate 
A'. 
conditional inferences based on pivots Q~e,e,A1 , ••• ,Ap)' 
rather than restricting attention to I\(8-8). Of course the 
search for exact equivalence of conditional frequentist and 
Bayesian inferences is in principle hopeless, but it is of 
interest to study ~he approximate formal equivalence, since 
this gives added force to the Bayesian method. 
What has been outlined here is a means of approximate 
analysis based on the actual information content of the data. 
The reader should consult Barndorff-Nielsen (1980), Amari 
(1982a,b), and other cited references, for theoretical 
details. 
The question I should like to address now is the extent 
to which our discussion generalizes, beyond the case of in-
dependent sampling with fixed sample size. This draws us 
back to the relationships (2.1) (i) and (ii). No gene~al 
theoretical account seems to be possible at this stage, so 
we shall look at two interesting examples. The first deals 
with a non-stationary process, and the second deals with 
random sample size. 
Example 2. Autoregressive Process 
Let x1 ,x2 , ••• ,xn be modelled by the ARl process 
X = 0, 
0 
x. = ex. 1 + £. , J J- J j=l, ••• ,n , 
where £ 1 ,£2 , ••• are independent N(0,l). The earlier dis-
cussion applies if lel < 1, that is to say (2.1) and (2.2) 
hold, for large n, essentially because the process isergodi~ 
But for lel ~ 1, when the process is not ergodic, it is well 
known that (i') fails. What seems not to be well known is 
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that (i) still holds for 181 ~ 1, but (ii) fails. This re-
inforces the idea that (i) is the fundamental normal 
approximation of likelihood inference. 
The loglik~lihood fore based on x1 , ... ,xn is 
n 2 n 2 1(8) =constant+ 8tx.x. 1 - \8 tx. 1 , 1 J J- 1 J-
,.. 
so that the sufficient statistic is the pair (8,I) where 
,.. n n 2 .. ,.. n 2 8 = tx.x. 1/tx. 1 and I= -1(8) = tx. 1 ; 1 J J- 1 J- 1 J-
the normalized likelihood is exactly N(8,I-1). For lel ~ 1, 
the magnitude of variation in I prevents convergence of 
I/E(I), and (i') fails: another unconditional limiting dis-
tribution obtains for {E(I)}\ (8-8). The insufficiency of 
,.. 
8 alone, and the huge asymptotic fluctuations of I, make the 
unconditional limiting result clearly irrelevant for finite 
sample analysis. The sufficient privotal result I\(8-8) ~ 
~(0,1) has apparently been established for 8=1 and large n 
by both D. Siegmund and T. Lai, and empirical evidence such 
as is described below suggests validity of the result for 
101 ~ 1. 
The unconditional theory for the case 8=1 has been 
studied by Evans and Savin (1981), who enumerate the non-
normal limiting distribution of {E(I)}\(0-8); here E(I) = 
\n(n-1) is the true expectation of I at 8=1. Figure 1 shows 
(dotted curve) the induced approximate unconditional distri-
,.. 
bution of 8-0 for n=2O. The figure also shows (dashed lines) 
,.. 
the induced conditional normal approximations for 8-8 ob-
tained by "undoing" I\(0-8) = N(O,l) when I=\, 1 and 2 times 
E(I). (Simulation shows that when n=2O, Pr{I ~ \E(I)} = \ 
and Pr{I ~ 2E(I)} = 1/8, so that Figure 1 encompasses a 
reasonable span for I.) 
Evidently inference from the unconditional approximate 
distribution would be very misleading even if I= E(I). For 
example, still with n=2O, the unconditional result indicates 
,.. 
that values of e smaller thane - 0.4 = 0.6 would be signi-
ficant evidence that e is less than 1, rather than equal to 
- 7 -
~ 
Figure 1: Comparison of induced distributions for e-e 
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Figure 2: Rankit plots of 200 simulated values of pivot 
P=I½(8-0) for ARl process with x0 =0 and.n=20. 
Upper graph: 8=1. Lower graph: 0=2. 
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one, at the 5% level. But the conditional significance level 
A 
at 8 = 0.6 is 5% for I= 1/l0E(I), less than 1% for I= \E(I) 
and essentially zero for I> E(I). 
Should econometricians test 8=1 using the unconditional 
result, there will be a lot of random walks: in econometric 
models! 
Are the approximations in fact of reasonable accuracy? 
Yes and no. Figure 2 shows rankit plots of 200 simulated 
values of I½(8-8) for the cases 8=1.0 and 2.0 with x0 =0 and 
n=20. The plots for 8 near 1 show a perceptible bias, which 
disappears for 8=2. The folded distributions agree very well 
with theoretical approximation: in 10,000 cases with 8=1 the 
frequencies with which I(8-8) 2 exceeded the 2%, 5% and 10% 
points of xf were respectively 1.98%, 4.99% and 9.98%. 
Example 3. Sequential Sampling 
Let.{X(t):t ~ 0} be a wiener process with drift rate 8, 
i.e. increments dX(t) are independent N(8dt,dt). Anscornbe 
(1957) considered this model under two sampling rules: (a) 
stop sampling at T=t
0
, (b) stop sampling when first X(t)=x0 • 
In general, the stopping time T andX:X(T) are jointly suf-
ficient for data-dependent stopping rules, and so a possi-
A 
bility of approximate ancillarity exists. But 8=X/T is suf-
ficient under either of rules (a) and (b). The normalized 
likelihood is always exactly N(8,I-1 ), IET. Under rule (a), 
I½(8-8) is exactly N(0,l), but the same is not so under rule 
(b). Thus, as Anscombe pointed out, at the level of exact 
inference it is not always possible to obtain frequency-
based inference that agrees with the likelihood principle--
a principle fundamental to Bayesian inference. Nevertheless, 
in the sample space in which samples are embedded to obtain 
frequency, I½(8-8) is still approximately N(0,l). The exact 
density of Q = I½(S-8) under rule (b) is 
, 
A 
where 8 is a function of q. (Somewhat mischievously, the 
A 
usable approximation p(qjx
0
,8) is exactly ,Cq)!) It would 
be of some interest to consider a general stopping rule with 
(T,X) both random. · 
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A rather different sequential scheme was investigated 
by Grambsch (1980). She showed that f½r,,..independent x1 ,x2 , 
••• ,XN with N = inf(n:I ~ io), still I (8-8) ~ N(0,l). 
What these two examples suggest is that "1~(8-8) ~ 
N(0,l)" is a very general normal approximation, appropriate 
when the likelihood is approximately norma~ shaped. Or, put 
another way, the result of applying Bayes'~ theorem has 
approximate validity in a frequency sense if the sample 
sequence is embedded in a suitably small subset of the sam-
ple space--this "suitably small subset" being determined 
by an approximately ancillary statistic when possible. Much 
further work is needed before these vague ideas and sug-
gestions can be turned into a concrete, reliable approximate 
theory--if this is indeed possible. What is not in doubt, 
"' however, is that unconditional asymptotic theory for 8 is 
insufficient both in the technical sense and in the practi-
cal sense. 
3. Data-based Transformation: Box-Cox Revisited Again 
A conventional mathematical formulation for linear re-
gression on explanatory variables~ with random deviations 
is 
T Y. = 8 u. + a£. 
1 1 1 
, i=l, ••• ,n (3.1) 
where £1 , ••• ,£n are independent N(0,l). In practise Y may 
be a derived measurement, e.g. logarithm or reciprocal of 
an actual measurement, and clearly some empirical judgement 
should be involved in such a particular choice of Y. Box 
& Cox (1964) proposed and studied a particularly useful 
class of derived measurements obtained from actual measure-
ments X, namely Y = (XA-1)/A. The data then provide evi-
dence about those values of A which are compatible with 
models of the type (3.1). The literal extension of (3.1) is 
Xi(A) = (X~-1)/A = 8Tui + 0£i, i=l, ••• ,n. (3. 2) 
A maximum likelihood approach to model fitting is first 
"' to obtain A, and then to apply standard least squares to 
"' data'{(ui,xi(A)}, i=l, ••• ,n}. But what of inference? 
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·Bickel & Doksum (1981) show that under model (3.2), the dis-
~ ~2 
tributions of 8 and a can be very much more dispersed than 
if A were known, and hence not estimated •. For example, if 
u = 1 and A= 0, then /n(8-8) ~ N(O,a2+t 2), t 2 = l/6a2 
(1+8 4/a4)--the extra term t 2 being "due to estimation of A". 
To my chagrin, this particular result was first noted by 
myself (Hinkley, 1975). 
Bickel & Doksum's remarkable observation is mathematic-
ally correct, but statistically incorrect: the variance in-
flation is not relevant to data analysis. This is an in-
stance where the mathematical model has come adrift from its 
motivating moorings. A simple example will clarify the main 
point. 
Suppose that we have two samples of positive measure-
ments x--so that associated u vectors are (1,1) and (1,-1), 
say--and that we wish to compare the two sampled populations. 
The simplest type of comparison is via means, so we fit 
~ 
model (3.2) and find A=O. In all respects the two samples 
appear to suggest that (3.2) fits well. Whatever be the 
true population A, our data model says that logex~N(µi,a 2) 
in sample i, i=l,2. For reasonably large n, then, our com-
parison is summarized by the following statement 
(3.3) 
where µi is the mean of logeX in population i"; n1 and n2 
are sample sizes. In contrast to this statement is one based 
on Bickel & Doksum's results, which takes the form 
(3.4) 
where 02 is ••• ". 02 is what? All that can be said is that 
e2 is the mean population contrast of some unknown trans-
formation of X! The point is that (3.3) is a scientifically 
complete statement, whereas (3.4) is not. Further, (3.3) 
matches the interplay between data modelling and statistical 
inference--it is the same statement that would be made if we 
arrived at the log transformation by some other logical ex-
ploratory method. 
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The statement (3.3) deserves an extended discussion, 
which will be given elsewhere (Hinkley and Runger, 1982). 
Here only the key points will be mentioned. First, (3.3) is 
the inference in a context which does not makeµ= log x ofa 
e 
prior interest--that would involve a different analysis, 
clearly, since logeX need not always appear to be normally 
distributed. Secondly, the probability result used in (3.3) 
needs justification. In the absence of the extended dis-
cussion, I will note that (3.3) is precisely the statement 
that you, the reader, would use if I presented you with the 
Normal-looking values of logeX and asked for a statement 
about µ1-µ 2• Thirdly, the difficulty can be ascribed to 
incompleteness of formulation: (3.2) should really be 
, i=l, ••• ,n , 
,.. ,.. 
where roughly speaking 8(m) = E(SIA=m). (Box and Cox re-
scale x(A) to offset the incomparability of 8(A) values as 
A varies.) The Bickel & Doksum phenomenon .of variance in-
flation is simply that 
,,._ A A ,,._ ,,._ ,,._ ,,._ 
Var· ( e) = E var {e (A) I A} + var E {e (A) I A} · 
where the second term on the right is the inflation--which 
,.. 
we necessarily discount when we fix our scale by Ab and 
~ 0 S 
make an inference about 8(Aobs>· Fourthly, there is the 
Bayesian approach. Note that the marginal posterior for 8 
will give, approximately, (3.4) and this is deemed to be ir-
,.. 
relevant. What is required, if A=0 as before, is the 
posterior distribution for e2 (0) = µ1-µ 2• This distribution· 
can be derived, approximately, by writing 8(0) ~ 8(A)-A8 2(0). 
I leave the reader to follow this approach through to (3.3). 
I have already mentioned that for a parameter of prior 
interest, such as µ1-µ 2 , the analysis would be different. So 
it would for a predictive statement about the observable X. 
For inference relative to a fixed a priori scale, the Bickel 
& Doksum ~esults do not apply mathematically or statistically. 
For some relevant work see Carroll and Ruppert (1981). 
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The lessons to be learned here are (i) that care must 
be exercised in model statement (compare (3.2) and (3.3)), 
and (ii) that inference statements must be physically com-
plete, i.e. well defined and relevant. 
4. Randomized Designs and Their Analyses 
Two subjects are of interest here, classical experi-
mental design and sample survey analysis, the common element 
being randomization--in the first case used to allocate 
units to treatments, and in the second case used to select 
units for measurement. My main point is that the general 
concept of ancillarity plays an important role in both design 
and analysis, in the sense of pre- and post-design blocking. 
Symbolic summaries of the randomized design problems 
would be as follows: 
Experimental Design: Given a set of designs n = {d1 , ••• ,dM}, 
-1 
apply the random design D where Pr(n=dj) = M • 
Sample Survey (with Replacement): Given population units 
~1 , ••• ,~N' a design dis a point in {~1 , •••. ,~N}n. From the 
set n = (d1 , ••• ,dM), M=Nn, choose a random design D such 
that Pr(D=di) = M-1 • (D involves individual selections 
- -1 u1 , ••• ,un such that Pr(Ui=u.) = N .) J . 
It is sometimes argued that Dis an ancillary statistic 
and hence that randomization theory of statistics is incom-
patible with the theory of conditioning on ancillary sta-
tistics. This interesting twist of logic belies the purpose 
of an ancillary statistic, which is to act as an indicator 
of appropriate reference sets. (Part of the absurdity of 
the exact logic was mentioned in Example 1.) One point that 
has been made is that randomization is often used to make 
normal-theory analysis valid (approximately), in which case 
Dis ancillary by design. A second point is that the an-
cillary statistic should partition n only as far as is sta-
tistically useful--i.e. as far as the relevant subsets of 
the. a priori sample space. Two examples will clarify the 
situation. 
Example 4. Knight's Move Latin Squares 
In 1931, Tedin reported on a detailed analysis of the 
SxS Latin Squares as applied to some uniformity data (agri-
cultural plot responses in the absence of treatment). These 
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· particular data evidenced spatial correlation. The SxS 
Latin Squares D can be subdivided into n1 = Knight's Move 
Squares, D2 = Diagonal Squares, n3 = Other·Squares. If we 
denote by oi the randomization standard error of a treatment 
_contrast conditional on DEDi' then Tedin showed that o1 <o3 
<a 2 for his uniformity data. However, the estimated vari-A2 , 
ance a based on residual sum of squares behaves in contrary 
fashion, the restricted randomization means satisfying 
The central equality validates normal-theory estimation of 
standard error for the restricted randomization over n3• 
Thus the ancillary indicator of design subset can be used in 
conjunction with empirical data to facilitate design. 
Of course if reliable estimates of oi were available, 
one could select D from D without restriction and then use 
the ancillary subset indicator in the data analysis to obtain 
the relevant standard error of a contrast: n1 would be a 
preferable restriction in such a situation. If a spatial 
correlation model accounted for the differences noted by 
Tedin, then presumably appropriate analyses under that model 
would distinguish between n1 , n2 and n3 on the basis of an 
(approximately) ancillary statistic. 
Further discussion of this example may be found in 
Yates (1965). 
Example 5. Ratio Estimation of a Population Total 
The following situation seems to be common in some cen-
sus problems. For a population of units (u1 ,u2, .•• ,uN)' 
each of which possesses quantitative characteristics x and 
y, there is complete knowledge of x1 , ... ,xN. It is now 
desired to estimate T. = !y1., and the pairs (x,y) can be mea-~ 
sured on a random sample of units. Thus we obtain a random 
sample'{(x1 ,y1 ) , .•• ,(xn,Yn)}. The ratio estimator of Tis 
A N 
T = (rxi)y/x , 
1 
-ln 
x = n rx. , 
i J 
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-ln y = n ry .• 
1 J 
• 
Several estimates V of Var(T) have been proposed, and 
some are justified on the grounds that their means over the 
full randomization distribution are nearly unbiased. Such 
justification is rightly challenged by Royall and Cumberland 
(1981), on the well-documented empirical evidence that often 
the values of x1 , ••• ,xn define r!levant subsets of the full a 
priori sample space. Thus Var(Tlx1 , ••• ,xn) and E(Vlx1 , ••• , 
xn)--carefully interpreted--may be very unequal, as they both 
vary with the xi. This could often be anticipated because in 
many cases Y ~BX+ a(x)e is a plausible model. Then the 
relationship between (x1 , ••• ,xn) and (x1 , ••• ,xN) can be used 
as an ancillary indicator in a conditional infer~nce, based 
A 
on estimate T. In effect the indicator would act as a post-
~ 
data stratification instrument. 
In both examples it is suggested that a statistical in-
dicator .a(D) be used to split D into subsets, either for the 
purpose of design or for the purpose of analysis. In the 
latter case, the value of a(D) will define a subset on which 
the inferential probability is defined, either by restricted 
randomization or by some plausible model that is validated 
by the randomization. 
5. Robust Estimation 
A great deal of effort has gone into the following prob-
lem: if x1 , ... ,xn are independently distributed each with 
density of the form f(x-0) where f(y) is symmetric about y=O, 
what is a good estimate for 8 if the form off is unknown? 
Our language has been enriched by terms such as contamination, 
leverage and break-down point, and dozens of estimators have 
been studied intensively--both by brains and by computers. 
One thing seems to have been overlooked: how does one analyse 
a given data set? 
A common approach to robustness theory might be de-
scribed simply as follows: Consider a class I of statistical 
A 
functionals t(··) such that t(F) is an unbiased estimate of 
A n 
0, Fn being the empirical distribution function. Then if 
attention .can be restricted to-~ class; of underlying 
- 16 -
A 
distribution functions F, choose the estimate t(F) to obtain 
2 n 
min max E{t(Fn)-8} • Often F would be a neighborhood of a 
te:li Fe:.1 
special distribution, such as the Normal. 
An asymptotic theory for statistical functionals gives 
,.. 
unconditional normal approximations for t(Fn)-8. But this 
seems unsatisfactory on several grounds. First, parametric 
inference shows convincingly (Efron & Hinkley, 1978) that the 
,.. 
~elevant pre:ision for t(Fn) should be tied to the residuals 
ei = xi - t(Fn). Secondly, statisticians diagnose data with 
the aid of things such as normal plots, and can often gain 
information about which Fis appropriate by using the resid-
uals. Should we worry that F might be capable of producing 
very large deviations x-8, if in fact the given data yields 
the best normal plot we ever saw? Clearly not. Related to 
this is the more specific conjecture: that whatever Fis, X 
is a pretty good estimate if a goodness-of-fit test of nor-
mality does not reject the normality hypothesis. This seems 
,.. ,.. 
plausible because for any choice oft, X = t(Fn) + dt(e), 
whereas a goodness-of-fit statistic for a particular F must 
,.. ,.. ,.. 
be of the for~ gt,F(e). The cova~iation of (dt(e),gt,F(e)) 
will keep dt(e) in check if gt,F(e) lies near its expected 
value under F. 
Would it be reasonable to choose the estimator t and 
calculate its standard error as if F=F0 when the observed 
data are compatible with F
0
? In a general sense one would 
say "yes", because this is how applied statisticians behave 
when they first model their data. The theoretician would be 
doubtful. The key question might be posed in the following 
simple form: Suppose .1 = (F1 , ••• ,Fm), that 
and that F.1 is the Fj which is closest to Fn (in an appropri-
ate sense). Is it then true that 
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(The same question is of interest for unconditional vari-
ances.) If true, this Jould parallel a Bayesian analysis 
for relatively uninformative priors: 
,.. ,.. ,.. 
=:p ( 8 I t ( F n) , e, F ;> , 
-1 2 "' 
whic~ is appr~xi~ately a N(O, n ak(e)) distribution for 
8-t(Fn) when F1=Fk. 
Of course a Bayesian analysis has the general advantage 
of responding to specific features of the data. What I am 
suggesting is that careful attention to robust inference 
might reveal a sensible, responsive frequency theory which 
essentially justifies the results of a Bayesian analysis. 
The unconditional distribution theory prevalent in robustness 
literature is fine for choosing estimates which are generally 
good, but not for analysis of a particular data set. 
REFERENCES 
AMARI, s. (1982a). Differential geometry of curved exponen-
tial families--curvatures and information loss. Ann. 
Statist., 10 (June issue). 
AMARI, s. (1982b). Geometrical theory of asymptotic ancillar-
ity and conditional inference. Biometrika, 69 (to 
appear). 
ANSCOMBE, F.J. (1957). Dependence of the fiducial argument 
____ on the sampling rule. Biometrika, 44, 464-469. 
BARNDORFF-NIELSEN, D. (1980). Conditionality resolutions. 
Biometrika, 67, 293-310. 
BICKEL, P.J. and DOKSUM, K.A. (1981). An analysis of trans-
formations revisited. J.Am.Statist.Assoc., 76, 296-311. 
BOX, G.E.P. and COX, D.R. (1964). An analysis of transforma-
tions (with discussion). J.R.Statist.Soc., B26, 211-252. 
CARROLL, R.J. and RUPPERT, D. (1981). On prediction and the 
power transformation family. Biometrika, 68, (to appear~ 
COX, D.R. (1980). Local ancillarity. Biometrika, 67, 279-
286. 
- 18 -
• 
• EFRON, B. and HINKLEY, D.V. (1978). Assessing the accuracy 
of the maximum likelihood estimator: Observed versus 
expected Fisher information. Biometrika, 65, 457-482. 
EVANS, G.B.A. and SAVIN, N.E. (1981). The calculation of the 
limiting distribution of the least squares estimator of 
the parameter in a random walk model. Ann.Statist., ~' 
1114-1118. 
GRAMBSCH, P. (1980). Likelihood inference. Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, University of Minnesota. 
HINKLEY, D.V. (1975). On power transformations to symmetry. 
Biometrika, 62, 101-111. 
HINKLEY, D.V. (1980). Likelihood as approximate pivotal dis-
tribution. Biometrika, 67, 287-292. · 
HINKLEY, D.V. and RUNGER, G. (1982). Analysis of Box-Cox 
transformed data. University of Minnesota School of 
Statistics Technical Report. 
ROYALL, R.M. and CUMBERLAND, W.G. (1981). An empirical study 
of the ratio estimator and estimators of its variance 
(with discussion). J.Ann.Statist.Assoc., 76, 66-88. 
TEDIN, o. (1931). The influence of systematic plot arrange-
ment upon the estimate of error in field experiments. 
J.Agric.Sci.Camb., 21, 191-208. 
YATES, F. (1965). A fresh look at the basic principles of 
the design and analysis of experiments. Proc. Fifth 
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Prob-
ability,!, 777-790. 
The author was partially supported by National Science 
Foundation Grant MCS-79-04558. 
- 19 -
School of Statistics 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
